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THE FAILURE OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING




In the post-9/11 world, much discussion within the American
governmental bureaucracy has focused on the protection of the
American public from emerging global threats. While much of the
rhetoric has centered on obvious concerns of physical security, this
protectionist mentality extends to various sectors of the American
business community. While support for an "America-first" business
approach has ebbed and flowed throughout the expansion of
international trade in the Twentieth Century, free trade proponents have
viewed this approach with great skepticism, particularly in the latter
half of the century. For fhose touting the domestic benefits of a
protectionist system, the borderless trade policies advanced by Western
interests in the late 1980s and 1990s reaffirmed their commitment to
restraining its progress. Meanwhile, advocates of the "open market tl
have taken every opportunity to call attention to any positive
contributions that result. Given these entrenched positions and the vast
differences between these two influential sides, the state of American
trade policy remains in continual flux.
Antidumping illustrates the economic quandary of balancing the
promise of free trade with the realities of sovereign insecurities. Over
time, United States antidumping law has evolved into a multifaceted
process that has delighted some, frustrated others, and confused many.
To help illustrate the many controversies and complexities of this
system, this note will first examine the origins and development of
antidumping measures in the United States. It will then detail the
current processes for resolving dumping disputes and include an
analysis of several problem areas in the current American system.
* J.D. Candidate, University of South Carolina School of Law;
International M.B.A. Candidate, University of South Carolina Moore School of
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Finally, the note will carefully scrutinize the American process in
action through the review of a current dumping issue involving the
American shrimping industry.
While one's opinion with regard to the U.S. antidumping
regulatory regime often develops from their general position on free
trade, the several shortcomings of the current system should be obvious
to many. Some of the flaws in the American system include: a subsidy-
like provision known as the "Byrd Amendment;" the use of the
inequitable dumping determination mechanisms such as "cumulation tl
and "zeroing;lI and an ignorance of a WTO provision requiring special
treatment for "developing countries." As this note will illustrate l U.S.
antidumping law can be improved to protect both domestic consumers
and the global market without leaving domestic industries vulnerable to
truly unfair international trade practices.
DEFINING DUMPING, BOTH GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY
One cannot accurately evaluate the effectiveness of an
antidumping regulatory regime without a clear understanding of what
actions conslitute dumping. The United States defines dumping in one
of two ways: (I) a foreign producer sells a product in the Uniled Slales
at a price below the sales price within the producer's country of origin;
or (2) a foreign producer sells a product at a price lower than the cost of
production. 1 Any difference between the two prices, or between the
price and cost to produce, is referred to as the dumping margin and
used as direct evidence in proving a dumping charge. 2 In general,
antidumping regulations are intended to compensate for this margin by
imposing duties to an equivalent extent.
While the types of products thai can be dumped on the market
are limitless, the motivating factor of increasing revenues remains the
same. Despite this singular goal, economists have identified several
forms of dumping which operate distinctively. The most common type
is "predatory dumping," which occurs "when companies export at low
prices to drive rivals out of business and obtain monopoly power."] A
similar form is "strategic dumping," which "combines low export prices
with a protected home market to give exporters an advantage. ,,4 Not all
I U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Int'] Trade Admin., An Introduction to U.S.
Trade Remedies, available at http://ia.ita,doc.gov/intro/.
2 [d.
J CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, ANTIDUMPING REFORM: TIME To Go BACK TO THE
BASICS, Vol. 8, Num. 7, at 3 (2004).
4 [d.
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dumping actions have such greed-driven purposes though. Both
"cyclical dumping," oversupply in an industry developing from a
dramatic reduction in demand, and "State-trading dumping," the
intentional oversupplying of a domestic industry to obtain hard
currency, are more the result of institutional ineptitude than intentional
misconduct. 5
THE ORtGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFECTIVENESS Of ANTIDUMPING
REGULATION
Regardless of the method of dumping, many domestic industries
have long responded to such actions by seeking the assistance of the
government. Despite the theoretical existence of dumping since the
advent of international trade, it was not until the twentieth century that
a nation-state recognized the issue and responded with a legislative
measure.
In 1904, Canada passed the first national antidumping law in the
modem era' Under the guise of alleged dumping by the U.S. steel
industry, the Canadian government reasoned that such a response was
justified and necessary in the event that a foreign producer "put aside
all reasonable considerations tt to obtain control of a domestic market. 7
One cannot fail to acknowledge the irony of the first national
antidwnping law resulting from U.S. business actions given its place in
the world today as the strongest proponent of the use of such
mechanisms. Shortly after Canada's actions, several other nations,
including Australia, New Zealand and the United States followed this
lead under a similar rationale,!!
The roots of the U.S. government's policy on antidumping
regulation actually stem from antitrust law of the late Nineteenth
Century.9 In particular, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 could be
applied to foreign commerce and any related monopolization
techniques employed by foreign companies in the United States. 10
However, such application was limited to sales contracts made only in
5 1d
6 ANTIDUMPING: How IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT 14 (1. Michael
Finger & Nellie T. Artis eds., 1993) [hereinafter WHO GETS HURT].
'[datIS.
8 GREG MASTEL, ANTIDUMPING LAWS AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 18 (M.E.
Sharpe ed., 1998).
9 1. Michael Finger, The Origins and Evolution Qf Antidumpting
Regulation in WHO GETS HURT, supra note 6, at 18.
to [d.
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the United States." Thus, foreign businesses could avoid any such
liability with careful planning as to where sales contracts were signed.
Seeking to address this problem, the federal government passed
the Antidumping Act of 1916. This measure made it illegal to import
goods at less than the actual market value if done with the predatory
intent to injure, or destroy, the U.S. industry against which it was
competing. 12 Borrowing from antitrust law, the Act used criminal
penalties and treble civil damages as enforcement mechanisms. 'J
However, not only did the requirement of predatory intent prove too
difficult a standard to establish, it also failed to account for a significant
amount of dumping performed without such an intent but equally
devastating to domestic industries. 14 Given this high standard, no
plaintiff has been able to successfully prove damages under this
measure. IS
Recognizing this deficiency, Congress passed the Antidumping
Act of 1921, which continues to serve as the foundation for U.S.
antidumping regulation to this day. The measure offered a more
expansive definition of dumping and "empowered" the U.S. Secretary
of the Treasury with the ability to impose a duty upon foreign
producers whom the Secretary detennines to having dumped their
products on the U.S. market. I6 Thus, the Act broke with existing
antitrust law by replacing civil damages with the appropriate
antidumping duties. Further, the empowerment of the Treasury
Department signaled an administrative change in jurisdiction over
dumping matters from the judiciary to the executive branch. The most
important legal development from the passage of the 1921 Act
pertained to a broadened standard of proof for injury, which was
accomplished by removing the requirement of having to prove "intent"
of predatory pricing." As a result, the United States had less difficulty
establishing a "dumping" claim and applying an appropriate remedy.
The passage of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act in 1930 further
solidified the jurisdictional shift away from the judiciary. It placed
further responsibility in the hands of the Treasury Department to
determine both incidents of dumping and injury and limited the
I [ Id.
12 Id.
13 MASTEL, supra note 8, at 18.
14 !d. at 21.
15 WILLIAM H. LASH III, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: A
PRIMER 26 (The American Enterprise Institute ed., t998).
Iii WHO GETS HURT, supra note 6, at 20.
17 MASTEL, supra note 8, at 21.
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judiciary's role to strictly matters of law. 18 Through this legislation,
Congress entrusted the Treasury with the power to determine if a U.S.
industry is "materially injured" by goods sold at less than fair value. 19
The Act defined l1 material injury" as "harm which is not
inconsequential" and instructed the corresponding authority to consider
the following factors in making such a determination: the volume of
the imports in question; the effect of those imports on the price of
domestic-like products; and the overall impact of such in:,p0rts on the
domestIc mdustry producmg those domestic lIke products.-
While the 1930 Tariff Act was amended and eventually repealed,
these definitions still form the legislative basis for modem antidumping
law in the United States. From 1890 to 1930, U.S. antidumping
regulation experienced a dramatic shift in approaches taken by the
federal government. Most noteworthy, the role of the judiciary has
dissolved with economic evaluations replacing legal determinations.
Whether such a shift in policy was the result of the exponential growth
in international trade during this period, or of the rise of American
business power during the early Twentieth Century, the lasting effects
continue to this day.
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS tN U.S. ANTIDUMPING REGULATORY POLlCY
By tracing the early development of U.S. antidumping
regulation, one can better understand the modem American mindset
with regard to this issue. Following the enactment of the 1930 Tariff
Act, antidumping law in the United States remained static for the next
forty-plus years. But with the passage of the Trade Act of 1974,
Congress made a small but significant change in the standard used to
determine material injury. In particular, the legislation defined "less
than fair value" for detennining "material injury" to include not just
goods sold at prices below the home-market price, but also goods sold
below the cost of production. 21 This change further expanded the
definition of dumping and exacted a clearer standard from which such
determinations could be made.
In 1979, Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act, a measure
that replaced the 1921 Antidumping Act. This legislation amended the
Tariff Act of 1930 to comply with the Antidumping Code of the
" Id. at 19-20.
19 TARIFF ACT OF 1930, 19 U.S.c.A. § 1673 (West Supp. 2005).
20 TARIFF ACT OF 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677 (West Supp. 2005).
21 MASTEL, supra note 8, at 21.
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General Agreement of Tarilfs and Trade (GATT). 22 In addition to
codifying two major goals of the GATT Code pertaining to public
openness in antidumping and the general discouragement of trade
barriers, the Trade Agreements Act also included the Code requirement
of firmly establishing a causal link between dumped imports and any
alleged material injury." One other important change in the 1979 Act
was administrative in nature. Specifically, the legislation placed
responsibility for any such antidumping determinations with the
Department of Commerce.24 No longer would the Treasury
Department playa role in such trade affairs.
Throughout the 1980s, U.S. policy with regard to antidumping
further evolved with the passage of the Trade and Tarilf Act of 1984
and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. In addition
to further refining the definition of "fair market price," these measures
also broadened the number of products susceptible to antidumping laws
and gave the U.S. Trade Representative the authority to request an
antidumping investigation. 25 Despite these developments in the United
States, unprecedented worldwide economic growth fostered an
environment that sought to reduce any governmental impediments to
international trade, thus ushering in a new era of free trade.
The inevitable collision between new world free trade and old
world regulation occurred at the Uruguay Round of GATT
Negotiations, which took place between 1986 and 1994. The overall
product of these negotiations was the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Throughout these negotiations, much of the
discussion pertained to the compatibility of antidumping regulation,
particularly in the United States and Europe, with the free trade
environment. 26 In the end, these discussions resulted in the
replacement of the GATT Antidumping Code with a detailed system to
combat dumping which would then be enforceable against those
nations who ratified the agreement. Part of the agreement contained
elements consistent with the U.S. antidumping regime including:
granting legal standing of workers to file petitions; excluding low cost
sales from fair value determinations; using the process of cumulation in
making any material injury determinations; and providing for U.S. legal
22 Id.
23 JOSEPH E. PAITISON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS,
VoL t aI20(2004).
24 MASTEL, supra note 8, at 21.
25 Id. aI21-22.
26 GREG MASTEL, AMERICAN TRADE LAWS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND
181 (M.E. Sharpe ed. 1996).
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standards of due process and transparency throughout any dumping
proceedings." On the other hand, the agreement diverged from U.S.
law on several important aspects including: a five-year sunset review
of any dumping duties; an allowance for start-up costs which may be
unavoidably higher as a result of their economic nature; and the
consideration of industry support for any antidumping provisions. 211
One other noteworthy result of the Uruguay Round was the deference
given to national bodies in dispute settlement with regard to dumping
and injury determinations. 29 Specifically, WTO dispute settlement
panels cannot overturn the decisions of national authorities if they are
made in an "unbiased and objective" manner. 30 This nod to state
sovereignty limited the WTO's influence over the dispute resolution
process by leaving the door open for national dispute settlement
processes that push the boundaries of what constitutes an "unbiased and
objective" review. Thus l states were given substantial flexibility in the
use and implementation of antidumping mechanisms, which eventually
lead to numerous later-discussed conflicts in this area between
sovereign states, particularly the United States, and the WTO.
Following the adoption of the Uruguay Round agreement
through legislation in 1994, the United States generally adhered to the
antidumping provisions it had agreed upon. However, in the fall of
2000, Congress passed the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act, more commonly known as the "Byrd Amendment." This
controversial measure, advanced on behalf of labor interests and
domestic producers, required any antidumping duties collected by the
federal government to be distributed to those U.S. companies that had
brought forward the particular dumping c1aim. 31 Prior to the passage
of the Byrd Amendment, the duties went into the general fund of the
United States Treasury Department. 32 This action marked a major shift
in the U.S. antidumping policy because it amounted to a double penalty
for foreign companies that dumped their products on the U.S. market.
Thus, not only did these companies face the economic punishment of
27 PATIlSON, supra note 23, at 25.
28/d
29 MASTEL, supra note 26, at 183.
30 !d.
31 Dan Ikenson, Byrdening Relations: U.S. Trade Policies Continue to
Flout the Rules, FREE TRADE BULLETIN NO.5, (Center for Trade Policy Studies,
Washington, D.C.), Jan. 13,2004, available at http://freetrade.org!(sclectthe
hyperlink tab for "publications!!; then select the hyperlink "Free Trade
Bulletins tl ).
32 1d.
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import duties, they also were faced with the fact of such duties being
specifically directed to their competitors within the domestic industry.
Not surprisingly, many of the signatories to the WTO expressed
strong outrage towards the measure by arguing that it was Ita prohibited
subsidy under the WTO and GATT."" Surely one can find validity in
such criticism given the fact that this action ran contrary to the
promotion of free and fair trade principles enumerated in and advanced
by the 1994 WTO agreement. In early 2003, a WTO Appellate Body
reached a similar conclusion in determining that the Byrd Amendment
is incompatible with WTO rules. Yet while the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative has expressed a desire to comply with WTO
rules, neither the Executive Branch nor Congress has shown any
willingness to repeal the controversial measure. 34 This ignorance of
the purpose and goal of the WTO antidwnping agreement only serves
to weaken one of the few international bodies that has maintained real
and actual influence over many nation-states.
THE CURRENT PROCESS FOR RESOLVING DUMPING DISPUTES IN THE
UNITED STATES
Despite strong differences in opinion over the Byrd Amendment
and its compatibility WiIh WTO rules, the United States sought to
comply with most of the provisions of the 1994 agreement with regards
to antidumping actions. It set up a "two-step process" for managing
antidumping actions that involves related actions taken by two separate
federal agencies. In short. the United States Department of Commerce
(DOC) determines whether dumping has indeed occurred and the
International Trade Commission (lTC), an independent federal agency,
determines if those same dumred products have caused "injury" to the
competing domestic industry. 3
An antidumping action begins with the filing of a petition,
concurrently with the DOC and the lTC, by the allegedly injured
industry or industries. The petition should reference a specific product
and can be submitted by any "interested party" within an industry.
Many representatives within a particular business community may
establish standing as an "interested partytt including manufacturers,
33 Id.
34 Press Release, The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement
of USTR Spokesman Christopher Padilla on World Trade Organization
Arbitrators' Determination on the "Byrd Amendment" (Aug. 31, 2004)
available al http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/Spokesperson Statements.
35 MASTEL, supra note 26, at 73. - -
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distributors, laborers or trade associations. 36 In addition to identifying
the alleged dumper(s), the petition should contain materials supporting
the charge that sales are occurring at 111ess than fair value. ,,37 The
petitioner must also be sure to include allegations of "material injury"
or "threat of material injury" along with supporting materials
connecting such an injury to the supposed dumping practices of the
aforementioned violator. 38 These basic guidelines provide little
opportunity in the earliest stages of this procedure for the accused
"dumpers" to rebut any of these initial charges. While this approach
illustrates similarity to the ability of any plaintiff with standing to file a
claim against another party in the traditional American legal system, it
does not allow for a response from the adverse party nor does it provide
a mechanism to resolve claims that are eventually labeled frivolous in
nature.
The first determination regarding the petition comes from the
DOC's Office of International Trade Administration (ITA). This body
has twenty days after the filing of the petition to determine whether the
petition is adequate to go forward. This determination of legal
sutliciency is rather limited with regards to fact-finding and focuses
mainly on whether the proper party has filed the petition and whether
relief can be granted for the injury alleged given the supporting
information supplied by the petitioner.]9 Any failure to meet this
burden results in a dismissal of the claim. Again, the process does not
allow for input from the accused "dumpers".
While the ITA conducts the initial inquiry, the ITC concurrently
considers whether an injury occurred. The ITC has forty-five days
from the filing of the petition in which to make this determination.
However, should the ITA dismiss the case, the ITC will not issue
anything. In making this preliminary injury determination, the ITC is
determining if there is a "reasonable indication" that the petitioning
industry suffered a "material injury, is threatened by a material injury,"
or has been "materially retarded,,40 Throughout this stage of
determination, the Commission can rely on a variety of information,
including that received from the parties or obtained through its own
investigation. 41 Given the low standard of "reasonable indication" and
36 MICHAEL K. YOUNG, UNITED STATES TRADE LAW AND POLICY 55-56
(Carolina Academic Press ed. 2001).
]7 [d.
38 ld.
]9 [d. at 56-57.
40 [d.
41 [d.
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little time afforded respondents to defend against such allegations, the
ITC finds an injury in an !1 overwhelming majority of cases... 42
Should the ITC offer an affirmative preliminary ruling of an
injury within the required forty-five day time period, the responsibility
then shifts back to the ITA, which has 120 days to detennine if the act
of "dumping" indeed did occur. In this preliminary decision, the ITA
applies a standard of "reasonable basis to believe or suspect" that
foreign products are being sold at "less than fair value" in the United
States. 43 Using information obtained from the petitioners, respondents,
and independent investigation of the industry market and pricing
patterns, the ITA decides if goods are being dumped and, if so, the
appropriate "dumping margin" to be corrected:' The methods used to
calculate these dumping margins are controversial and will be
discussed more thoroughly later in this note. If such a finding occurs,
the Commerce Departtnent can assess duties that could not officially be
collected until an affirmative ITC final determination. 45 However,
should the ITA fail to find the presence of dumping, it is still required
to issue a final determination according to 19 U.S.c. § 1673(d).46
Following an affirmative determination of "dumping" in its
preliminary findings, the ITA then performs its final determination.
During this thorough review, ITA officials conduct more detailed
factual and legal fact-finding and analysis of the situation, which often
can include on-site inspection of the foreign respondents operations.47
The ITA must present both its findings and the materials supporting
such a position within seventy-five days after issuing its preliminary
determinations. This step in the determination process seems repetitive
and unnecessary. Further, the fact that the ITA calculates the "dumping
margin ll prior to actually making on-site visits lends credence to the
argument that margin lacks accuracy.
The final say in the determination process rests with the lTC.
Here, the ITC issues its final decision on whether an "injury" occurred
as a result of the dumping action. By examining such factors as "the
amount of imports, increases in either the total or relative amount of
imports, the impact of imports on the price of the good, and the impact
of imports on the state of the domestic injury," the ITC must only
421d. at 59.
43 Id.
44 !d. at 60.
45 MASTEL, supra note 26, at 73.
46 YOUNG, supra note 36, at 60.
47Id.
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decide if the "imports are more than inconsequential or insiSioificant
contributing cause" of the injury to the domestic industry.' This
determination by the ITC must take place within forty-five days of the
final ITA decision. At this point in the process, an antidumping order
is issued and respondents are required to pay duties equivalent to the
"dumping margin" established in the ITA's final determination. The
U.S. Customs Service carries out the enforcement of the order.49
Notice that nowhere in this process does the respondent have a clear
opportunity to present its case before either the ITA or ITC. The
Respondent's only input comes as a result of targeted questions by the
investigators. Thus, an unrelated issue that may have some bearing on
the situation could easily be excluded from consideration.
Parties on the wrong side of any antidumping ruling do have the
ability to appeal to the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), which
can review, remand, and reverse the decisions should it find the
determination to be "unsupported by substantial evidence on the record,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law.1I50 This standard makes
the overruling of such a determination difficult, unless a respondent can
demonstrate the agencies' decisions to be "arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion."" Clearly, such a standard of review is difficult to
meet. However, respondents can also further appeal any CIT decision
to the appropriate Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. In complying with
the WTO rules, however, both the Department of Commerce and ITC
must review any such duty application five years after a final ruling to
determine if the penalty still remains necessary.
AN OVERVtEW OF ADDlTtONAL PROBLEM AREAS WITHtN THE U.S.
ANTIDUMPtNG DETERMINATION PROCESS
As previously discussed, the Byrd Amendment is a lightening
rod for critics of the U.S. antidumping regulatory regime. Its
protectionist leanings irritate foreign businesses, foreign governments,
international bodies and domestic consumers groups to no end.
However, this provision is just one of several mechanisms within the
U.S. antidumping regulatory strllcture that attracts the ire of the
international business community.
One such area pertains to "cumulation," a process used by the
ITC in making its "material injury" determination. "Cumulation"
41; ld. at 61.
49 Id. at 62.
50 [d. at 63.
51 ld.
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involves the aggregation of imports in antidumping disputes involving
imports from more than one source country. 52 The Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984 contained a provision implementing this process into U.S.
trade law, which had previously evaluated dumping disputes on a
country-by-country basis. 53 Under this type of regime, the American
imports of the multiple foreign businesses can be pooled together to
determine their share of the domestic market. Thus, the probability of
finding the existence of a lImaterial injury" substantially increases. ]n
fact, a study of antidumping cases that went before the ITC between
1985 and 1988 found that almost half of those involving an affirmative
detennination of Ilmaterial injury" were the direct result of the
cumulation. 54 While such discrepancies sound numerically logical, this
very same study further suggests that the lTC was "more likely" to find
for the existence of "material injury" when cumulation is used. 55
The 1984 Act allows for several exceptions to the cumulation
requirement. Most of the exceptions are political in nature and have
stronger basis in U.S. foreign policy than trade law. Specifically, the
ITC must refrain from cumulating imports from any country that has
ratified the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and
from Israel unless the imports come solely from Israel." Such
exceptions only contribute further to the validity of the criticism of the
cumulation policy. For not only does the use of the cumulation method
make it that much more probable for an affirmative injury
detenninatioTI, but the existence of exceptions also signals a recognition
by the United States of the harsh results of this process which can be
muted only through political means.
Although cumulation has long caught the ire of critics of the U.S.
antidumping system, there are other specific detennination mechanisms
used· in calculations to evaluate "material injury" and ascertaining
"dumping margins lt that frustrate the international trade community.
These include the process of "zeroing" and determination of "normal
52 Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas 1. Prusa, Cumulation and ITC Decision
Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater Than the Whole (Nat'l Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. W5062, March 1995).
53 Id.
54 Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, Antidumping 22 (Nat'l Bureau
of Economic Research, Working Paper No. W8398, July 2001), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract~278031.
55 [d. at 22.
5(, International Trade Commission, ITC Injury Investigations available at
www.adcvd.com/InjuryInvestigations.htm.
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value." Both issues will be discussed thoroughly later in the
examination of the shrimp dumping case.
Another area of controversy within the antidumping spectrum,
also political in nature, relates to special allowances given to
"developing" and "least-developed" countries in dumping actions.
There are no WTO definitions for "developing countries" and members
can announce whether they are a lldeveloped" or "developing" country.
"Least-developed" countries are designated as such by the United
Nations. According to Article 15 of the 1994 WTO Agreement,
members of the WTO who are "developed" countries must give
"special regard lt to the situations of "developing countries when
considering the application of antidumping measures."S? Article 15
further elaborates that when faced with such an instance, a "developed1t
country should thoroughly explore all possible remedies before
applying any duties pertaining to an affirmative finding of dumping."
Thus, under WTO rules, both the Department of Commerce and ITC
should theoretically give "developing" countries a little more leeway
before reaching a Iinal determination which results in import duties
being placed on these particular countries. However, "special regard"
is a rather ambiguous term that has led to various interpretations by
WTO member-countries. Not surprisingly, the inconsistency in
application has led to nomerous criticisms by both "developing" and
"developed" members. Opponents of such special treatment point to
the fact that "developing" countries contribute heavily to the number of
dumping cases in the "developed" world. On the other hand, many of
the "developing" countries argue that much of the "developed" world
has failed to give full recognition to the rights afforded them under
Article 15 of the WTO Agreement." The forthcoming case-study on a
dumping dispute pertaining to the American Shrimp industry will
further expand on this discossion.
At.TERNATlVES TO ANTIDUMPtNG DUTIES
Many opponents of the special treatment afforded "developing"
countries and "cumulation" often cite such controversies when
57 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (Anti-Dumping) of the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex I, Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment,
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exhorting the inefficiencies of the U.S. antidumping regulatory regime.
They point to more market-driven remedies for domestic commerce
such as existing antitrust law or safeguard actions. Proponents of the
antitrust system contend that the use of antitrust law would eliminate a
large area of potential abuse which exists under the current
antidumping regime, namely the filing of an antidumping action by a
domestic industry that wishes to keep its prices domestically high by
discouraging foreign competitors from enduring the high costs
associated with such a process. 60 Also, perhaps such a transition would
remove some of the international politics from the decision-making
process as foreign companies would receive the same treatment as U.S.
companies with regard to business competition. On the contrary,
enforcement issues could arise as U.S. courts would be limited in their
reach over foreign enterprises." Thus, the repeal of antidumping law
and transition back to anlitrust may prove mOre complicated than
proponents suggest.
Another possible replacement for U.S. antidumping regulations
is the safeguard action. Under this approach, tariffs or quotas are
placed on imports for only a limited time period, which under the WTO
rules can be granted for up to four years. 62 Based on this infonnation,
one can see little difference between such temporary quotas and the
five-year sunset review requirement in the antidumping regulation.
However, safeguard actions differ significantly in the following ways:
a higher standard of "injury" must be established by a domestic
industry; and they allow for penalized countries to receive temporary
compensation to offset any tariff or quota. 6.1 Opponents of such a
policy shift might argue that the higher standard places a large burden
on domestic industries and may discourage them from challenging even
legitimate dumping occurrences. Thus, regardless of which alternative
one chooses, neither clearly distances itself from current antidumping
law.
A CASE STUDY OF AN ANTIDUMPING ACTION: THE DUMPING OF
WARMWATER SHRIMP, FROZEN OR CANNED, ON THE U.S. MARKET
Given the complexities and controversies of the antidumping
process at both the national and international level, one may be able to
obtain a clearer understanding of the issue through an examination of a
0{) BARFIELD, supra note 3, at 15.
61 MASTEL, supra note 26, at 104.
62 BARFIELD, supra note 3, at 17.
(,3 Id.
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recent U.S. antidumping decision. Like so many U.S. industries prior
to globalization, the shrimping community had long been mostly
domestic in nature. All along the coasts of the Southeastern United
States, shrimpers operated in a tight-knit community in a trade that had
been handed down from generation to generation. But with a growth in
customer demand many restaurants and grocery stores were forced to
look elsewhere. With the advances in technology in the latter part of
the Twentieth Century, obtaining shrimp from other countries became
feasible and in time even more cost-effective. As a result domestic
shrimpers were forced to compete with foreign suppliers that were able
to offer the product at lower prices and in greater quantities. In time,
the domestic shrimping industry suffered economically as more and
more domestic sellers sought the product from international sources.
Eventually many of these domestic shrimpers were forced to give up
their trade on account of their inability to compete. Currently, shrimp
imports account for almost 90% of U.S. shrimp consumption. 64 As a
result, the number of active shrimpers in the Gulf Coast region has
dwindled by almost 60% in the past decade.65 The ones still struggling
to operate responded, as many U.S. industries have done in the past, by
seeking the assistance of the government in maintaining their
livelihood.
On December 31, 2003, the Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action
Committee of Washington, D.C., the Versagi Shrimp Corporation of
Florida, and the Indian River Shrimp Company of Louisiana filed
petitions with the DOC and ITC alleging the dumping of imports of
certain frozen or canned warm-water shrimp from Brazil, China,
Ecuador, India, Thailand and Vietnam." In their submissions, the
petitioners argued that the shrimping industry in the United States had
been materially injured and had been threatened with material injury by
the imports of frozen and canned warm-water shrimp imports from
these six countries at less than fair value (LTFV).67 Specifically, the
petitioners maintained that imports of such shrimp had increased by
50% from 2000 to 2002 while the wholesale prices of shrimp from
(>4 Don Matthew, The Fallacies of Shrimp Protectionism, June 27, 2004,
THE MISES INSTITUTE, available at http://www.mises.orglfullstory.aspx?control
~1551.
65 I d.
66 Certain Frozen or Canned Wannwater Shrimp and Prawns From Brazil,
China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, 3 USITC Pub. 3672, Inv. Nos.
73t-TA-I 063-1068, Preliminary, (February 2004) [hereinatler Preliminary
Report].
67 ld.
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these six countries dropped 28% in that same amount of time" Thus,
shrimp from these foreign countries comprised a much larger
percentage of the total shrimp sold in the United States and did so with
prices much lower than domestic shrimpers could offer. Seeking to
gain the beneficial political support of U.S. consumers groups, the
petition also pointed out that despite the lower wholesale prices of such
shrimp from foreign suppliers, the average cost of shrimp to the
American consumers in domestic restaurants had risen by 28%.69
Upon receipt of the petition, both the ITA and ITC commenced their
preliminary investigations, the former into the allegations of dumping,
while the laller sought to determine the existence ofa material injury.
1. The International Trade Commission Preliminary Determination
As previously mentioned, at this stage in the proceedings, the
ITC applied a legal standard of "reasonable indication" as to whether a
domestic industry had been materially injured or not. In considering
the information before them, the Commission sought to determine if the
record "contained clean and convincing evidence that there is no
material injury or threat of such injury; and no likelihood" that contrary
evidence could arise tluough an investigation. 70
The Commission first sought to define the "domestic like
product" and "domestic industry" in this particular case. According to
the Tariff Act of 1930, a "domestic like product" is that product which
is most similar to the product subject to the investigation. 71 Petitioners
argued that all domestically produced shrimp are a "like product." One
respondent sought to establish differences in the U.S. domestic shrimp
market between "primary processed" shrimp and "value added" shrimp,
which includes breaded shrimp. Respondents from India, Thailand,
and Vietnam also sought to define certain other types of shrimp as
separate "domestic like products... 72 In the end, the ITC dismissed the
respondents' contentions and settled on a single "domestic like
product" which included both fresh warm-water shrimp and processed
warm-water shrimp. Further, the Commission used factors such as
production-related activities and related parties to define the injured
fill Press Release, The Shrimp Alliance, Shrimp Petitions Fact
Sheet (December 31,2003) available at http://www.shrimpalliance.comIPress
%20Releases/Filing%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
69 [d.
70 See Preliminary Report, supra note 66.
71 Id. at 4.
72 Id. at 6.
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"domestic industry" as all domestic harvesters and processors of wann-
h . h . d 73water s nmp or s nmp pro ucts.
The next step in the Commission's preliminary determination
involved the evaluation of the volume of imports and the effect on
prices. Here, the lIC had to decide whether to cumulate the volume
and effects on prices of imports from all respondents. The Commission
sought to establish whether the imports in question competed with each
other and with other domestic like products in the United States. To
reach this determination, it considered factors such as: the degree of
fungibility between shrimp imports from different countries and
between imports and domestic warm-water shrimp; the presence of
sales in the same geographic market fonn different countries and
domestic wann-water shrimp; the existence of common or similar
channels for distribution for the shrimp from different countries and the
domestic warm-water shrimp; and whether the shrimp imports are
present in the domestic market simultaneously. 74 The Commission
eventually determined that all four factors were satisfied and that
cumulation was appropriate in this instance.
Having established the domestic product at issue, defined the
injured industry, and cumulated the imports at issue, the Commission
sought to determine if there was a "reasonable indication ll that the
domestic warm-water shrimp industry had been ltmaterially injured. II
Through the additional consideration of the conditions of competition
in this industry, the volume offoreign shrimp imported, the effect such
imports had on domestic wholesale prices, and the impact the shrimp
imports had on the overall domestic industry, the ITC eventually
concluded that there was a "reasonable indication" that the domestic
shrimp industry had been "materially injured" from the imports of the
warm-water shrimp from these six countries. The Commission issued
this determination within the forty-five day required time period in
February of2004.
2. The Preliminary Department ojCommerce (ITA) Determination
The ITA of the Department of Commerce initiated its
preliminary investigation of the imports of warm-water shrimp imports
on January 21, 2004, approximately twenty days after the petition was
filed. Thus, according to the ITA, there was legal sufficiency in the
petitioners' claims and the case moved forward.
73 !d. at 19.
74 Jd. at 20.
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On July 29, 2004, the Department announced a preliminary
finding of dumping by foreign companies in Brazil, Ecuador, India, and
Thailand. It determined particular dumping margins for each importer
and instructed the U.S. Customs Service to "begin to suspend
liquidation of entries of subject merchandise" and to I1 collect a bond or
cash deposit from the importer of record based on the margins found in
the Deparlment's preliminary determinations."" The ITA amended the
report three weeks later to correct particular errors in the "dumping
margin" calculations for certain importers.
3. Final Determination ofthe Department ofCommerce
On December 20, 2004, the Department issued its final
determination that importers from Brazil, Ecuador, India, and Thailand
had dumped frozen and canned warm-water shrimp at less than fair
value. The Department assigned appropriate dumping margins for each
importer which were consistent with the findings in its preliminary
report. On January 26. 2005, the Department amended the final
determination for ministerial errors and to offer the governments of
both India and Thailand thc use of ITA facl-finding teams to determine
the effects of the tragic tsunami of December 26, 2004, on the
shrimping industry in both India and Thailand. This well-intentioned
gesture, while primarily humanitarian in nature, offers a clear example
of the Department's practical and political flexibility with regard to
antidumping duties even after a final determination has been reached.
Despite its legitimate use in this particular situation, such flexibility
further illustrates the fluidity of U.S. antidumping law and provides
additional ammunition for critics of this system when critiquing it as
purely political and lacking any true legal justification.
4. Final Determination o.lthe international Trade Commission
Pursuant to section 735(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC
detennined that the U.S. shrimping industry was "materially injured"
by imports from Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam
for certain tlnon-canned" warm-water shrimp sold in the United States
75 Press Release, Dep't of Commerce, Fact Sheet on Preliminary
Determination in Antidumping Duty Investigations: Certain Frozen and
Canned Warmwater Shrimp from Brazil, Ecuador, India, and
Thailand, (July 29, 2004) available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/medialFactSheet/
0704ishrimp_072904.html.
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at less than "fair market value. n76 However, in its January 2005 report,
the Commission did not find the presence of such "material injury" in
the domestic shrimping industry from the imports of "canned" wann-
water shrimp from China, Thailand, and Vietnam. 77 Further, the ITC
determined that any injury from the importation of "canned" warm-
water shrimp from Brazil, Ecuador, and India were negligible and thus
did not amount to any "material injury. lin In summary, the
Commission seemed to vindicate shrimp importers from all six
countries from inflicting any "material injury" on the domestic industry
only with regard to "canned" warm-water shrimp. Thus, appropriate
duties could still be placed on those importers "dumping" non-canned
warm-water shrimp on the U.S. market.
Using the same factors in its preliminary analysis, the
Commission defined two domestic like products in this situation,
distinguishing between lIcannedu and "non-cannedll warm-water
shrimp.79 The ITC then conducted two separate analyses, similar to its
preliminary determination, of detining the domestic industry for both
the "canned" and tlnan-canned" warm-water shrimping industry. This
included a review of production related activities and related parties as
well as the use of cumulation in determining the volume and price
effects of the subject imports. Then, similar to the preliminary
investigation, the Commission considered whether "material injury"
had occurred in either the tlcanned" or "non-canned" domestic
shrimping industry. Using the same factors from its preliminary
determination including the conditions of competition, the volume of
imports, the price effects of imports and the impact of the imports on
the industry, the ITC found the domestic "non-canned" warm-water
shrimping industry to have been materially injured. gO However,
through analysis of the same factors with respect to the domestic
"canned" warm-water shrimping industry, no such material injury could
be established from such imports form China, Thailand, and Vietnam."
In addition, any finding of injury from imports of "canned"
shrimp from Brazil, Ecuador, and India were deemed negligible." For
76 Certain Frozen or Canned Wannwater Shrimp and Prawns From Brazil,
China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, 1 USITC Pub. 3748, Inv. Nos.
73 t-TA-I 063-1068, Final, (January 2005).
77 Jd.
" ld.
79 !d. at It.
80 ld at 36.
81 ld at 45.
l12 Jd.
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under 19 U.S.c. § 1677, any subject imports from one country, which
compete with domestic like products, that account for less than 3%
individually of all of that product sold domestically over the previous
year, are deemed negligible and not capable of materially injuring."
Further, should the imports of these individual countries when
cumulated together account for less than 7% of all imports of the
subject product, the Commission will make a determination of
negligibility and terminate its investigation with respect to those
. 84Imports.
Like the action taken by the DOC, the ITC recognized a possible
change in situations in both India and Thailand following the tsunami.
As such, the Commission has sought to collect information to
determine whether this disaster merits a changed circumstances review
under 19 U.S.C. §1675(b). Under this section of the Code, the
Commission can review whether revocation of the final detennination,
based on the change in circumstances of the subject importing country,
would lead to the continuation or recurrence of "material injury."85
Thus, should the Cummission find that the tsunami devastated the
shrimping industries in both India and Thailand to the point that they
no longer will be able to inflict "material injury" on the IInan-canned"
warm-water shrimping industry within the United States, the ITC could
then tenninate its determination. No decision has been reach at this
time.
EXAMINING THE PROBLEM AREAS OF THE U.S. ANTIDUMPING
REGULATORY REGIME WITH RESPECT TO THE SHRIMP ANTIDUMPING
CASE
One of the largest controversies in relation to the shrimp
dumping cases pertains to the U.S. enactment of the "Byrd
Amendment." As stated previously, this provision requires the
distribution of any antidumping duties collected by U.S. Customs as a
result of an antidumping decision to the determined "injured"
petitioners. Thus, not only does the domestic industry benefit from the
extra burden placed on foreign competition, it also reaps a direct
financial reward as a result ofduties placed on foreign importers.
In the shrimp dumping case, it is estimated that the petitioners
will benefit to the extent of $829,000 each on account of the Byrd
" Id. at 37.
H4 [d.
R5 [d, at 3.
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Amendment. 86 Given such a sizeable monetary award for the
petitioners, it should not be a surprise that the number of antidumping
cases have increased since the passage of this measure. g7 This type of
corporate welfare, in an industry where 90% of the product sold
domestically comes from foreign exporters, can only negatively atfect
the prices paid by U,s. consumers." Clearly, in this trade dispute and
others, the well-intentioned Byrd Amendment leaves both the U.S.
business and consumer sectors at a long-term disadvantage in the
global market while only providing short-term relief to a specific
industry.
Further, in 2003 a WTO appellate body ruled that the Byrd
Amendment violated the 1994 WTO Agreement." This action left
U.S. producers and exporters vulnerable to retaliation from any other
WTO countries that disagree with the application of this measure. In
fact, on May 1, 2005, the EU responded by imposing a "15% duty on
various types of paper, clothing, fabrics, footwear, and machinery -
amounting to tariffs worth approximately $28 million.,,90 In addition,
Canada has also recently imposed similar duties on "cigarettes, oysters
and live swine worth $14 million.,,9J Both governments will review the
duties annually and will measure their impact against the "fluctuating
amount of Byrd Amendment disbursements. n92
These responses from two of the U.S. largest trading partners
clearly illustrate the negative effect that the continued subsidization of
American industries will have on American producers and consumers
alike. In the shrimp case alone, these taritls will, at the very least,
result in higher prices for American consumers who purchase frozen
shrimp, as well as domestic restaurants and grocery stores that sell
frozen shrimp. Further, the threat of additional retaliatory tariffs from
R6 Bubba Gump Protectionism, WALL ST. 1., July 19, 2004 available at
http://webreprints.djreprints.comfl057200868910.htm!.
R7 The Shrimp Dumping Case and the Byrd Amendment, THE CONSUMING
INDUSTRIES TRADE ACTION COALITION SHRIMP TASK FORCE [hereinafter CITAC
SHRIMP TASK FORCE], of http://www.citac.info/shrimp/aboutJbyrd_amendment.
htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
8R Bubba Gump Protectionism, supra note 86.
119 See CITAC SHRIMP TASK FORCE, supra note 87.
90 Press Release, CITAC. CITAC Byrd Amendment Working Group
Launched to Push for the Repeal of "Trade Distorting Corporate Welfare
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burgeoning economies in India, China, and Brazil could have
devastating effects on all types of American producers and exporters.
By abdicating many of the free trade principles espoused by the
United States as a major player in the WTO, the short-sighted Byrd
Amendment actually fails to achieve its greater goal of truly protecting
Americans. For only a select few are protected while the great majority
of Americans are left to deal with the consequences. Congress would
be wise to repeal this misguided measure or at the very least repeal the
controversial remedy in a manner suiting to U.S. trade partners. While
any action short of repeal would likely not alleviate these concerns,
Congress could achieve some progress by subsidizing to a small extent
and/or for only a shortened period.
Another major problem area within the shrimp dumping case
relates to the method of "zeroing," which is used by the DOC in
calculating the "dumping margins." In making a "dumping margin"
calculation, as previously stated, the DOC usually cumulates the next
import price of the product and compares it to the "normal value" of
that product in the domestic country. This amount is then used as
evidence to detennine if dumping did indeed occur. When the
"nonnal" value is greater than the price at which the subject product is
imported, the difference is the "dumping margin" to be used in
detennining whether dumping occurred and, if so, the amount of duty
to be applied to compensate the difference. However, in the United
States, when the price of the imported product is actually greater than
the unarmal value" of the product domestically, the dumpin~ amount is
calculated as zero rather than any calculated negative value. 3 Thus, by
eliminating the use of negative margins in calculating the average
"dumping margin," there is a much greater chance of reaching the
conclusion that dumping has indeed occurred. 94 This system of
calculation creates doubts as to the accuracy of any dumping and/or
margin determination and can often lead to an inflated average
dumping margin. 95
In 200 I, the WTO appellate body ruled that the use of "zeroing"
violated its rules, which require !fa 'fair comparison' between export
prices and normal values. 1I96 Despite this ruling, which stemmed from
93 BARFIELD, supra note 3, at 28.
94 !d.
95 Sebastian Mallaby, Jumbo Shrimp Follies, THE WASH. POST,
November 15,2004, at A25 available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/
wp-d~n/A50t 73-2004Novt4.
6 Barfield, supra note 3, at 29.
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a case involving the European Union, the DOC continued to the
employ "zeroing" in antidumping detenninations. 97 Then in April of
2004, the WTO ruled specifically against the United States' use of
"zeroing" as it pertained to a case brought by Canada with regard to
lumber." After several months of deliberatiun, the DOC just recently
reached an agreement with Canada to discontinue the use of "zeroing"
in this particular case.99
The willingness of the U.S. to make such an accommodation
clearly signifies its recognition of the unfairness of the use of this
procedure. By greatly increasing the likelihood of finding the existence
of dumping, the use of "zeroing" only encourages more domestic
industries to make dumping allegations and pursue legal recourse. This
approach only further adds to the perception that the United States is
committed to fair competition in ±ree trade only when it obviously
benefits domestic industries and operates in a protectionist mode in all
other instances. In the shrimp dumping case for example, given that a
vast majority of the shrimp market in the United States comes ±rom
imports, the United States seems willing to use "zeroing" to find for
larger dumping margins for the minute domestic shrimp industry. Such
a mentality clearly contradicts the many international trade agreements
to which the United States has agreed to and supported. Only through
the elimination of the "zeroing" process and the application of an
equitable system accounting for accurate determinations can the United
States absolve itself of such a reputation.
Other methods in the dumping determination process also receive
strong opposition. The "cumulation" of goods from multiple countries
to detennine the presence of a "material injury" was discussed on page
87. While this method was not used in the shrimp dumping case, the
process used to calculate the ttnonnal value" of the shrimp for certain
countries in the shrimp case is worth noting. As previously discussed,
dumping occurs when an imported good is sold at less than the "normal
value" of the good sold in its own domestic market. The problem with
this approach is that ttcommon business practice" results in businesses
charging different prices in different markets based on many variables
97 Id.
98fd.
99 Press Release, CITAC Shrimp Task Force, U.S. Will End "Zeroing" In
Canada Lumber Dumping Case; Commerce Department Should End Same
WTD-IIIegal Practice in Shrimp Trade Case (Dec. 14, 2004) available at
http://www.citac.info/shrimp/press_releases/2004/12_14.htm.
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such as the cost of transportation, the cost of living, the cost of storage,
etc. JOO
Another problem in the calculation of "normal value" results
from the fact that foreign importers often do not sell the same product
on their domestic market. 101 The shrimp dumping case illustrates this
point well. For example, shrimpers in Thailand and Vietnam sell very
little frozen shrimp in their own countries. 102 Thus, there is no true
"home market" of which to compare in determining "normal value. tt
The ITA responded to this predicament by estimating the price of the
product in the "home market" through a comparison of surrounding
nations. 103 In the present case, the ITA examined the cost of
production in Bangladesh to come up with a "nonnal price" in
neighboring Vietnam. 104 One need not have a degree in international
trade law to recognize the great potential for inaccuracy in this process.
While Vietnam and Bangladesh are geographically related, the
economies of these Southeast Asian countries are decidedly different
and cost of production in one country could hardly be thought to clearly
reflect the price of the good in another country. This "apples and
oranges" method of comparison serves only to raise further questions
about the legitimacy of the U.S. process.
One final problem area found in the U.S. shrimp antidumping
case involves the supposed "special treatment ll to be afforded
"developing" and "least-developed" countries under Article 15 of the
1994 WTO Agreement. The "special regard" to be given such
countries, however, is ambiguous in definition and often ignored by
those in the developed world. Of those countries involved with U.S.
shrimp antidumping case, none have been designated "least-developed"
by the United Nations. However, all six nations (China, India,
Vietnam, Thailand, Brazil, and Ecuador) in the dispute have designated
themselves "developing1t countries. 105 Yet neither the ITC nor the
DOC referenced this particular status when making their
determinations regarding dumping and material injury. This disregard




104 See Mallaby, supra note 95.
10.5 World Bank, Data and Statistic: Country Groups available at
http://www.worldbank.org/ (select the hyperlink tab "Data and Research";
under the data column, select '!classification of economies" from the drop down
menu under "key statistics"; select the hyperlink nView all groups" under the
"Definitions of Groups" heading).
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serves only to weaken the WTO's rule-making authority. While the
U.S. is certainly not the only country to ignore this provision, its role as
the global economic and political leader endows it with a greater duty
to encourage growth and development.
While Brazil, China, and India all have economies that are
growing at impressive rates respectively. the same cannot be said for
Ecuador, Thailand and Vietnam. In fact, despite being the largest
foreign supplier of shrimp in the United States, Thailand maintains a
poverty rate of well-over 13%.">6 Unfortunately, these grim statistics
have only worsened since the tsuanmi disaster. In India alone, the
tsunami destroyed over 88,000 fishing boats and 200,000 nets vital to
the Indian shrimping industry.107 The poverty rate in Vietnam is even
higher, at 37%, and here the shrimp industry is thought to employ nine
million Vietnamese. l()~
The shrimp industry plays a large role in the economies of all
these nations and should have been taken into account when making
any determination that could result in such detrimental long-term
economic effects, The U,S. system should provide for some type of
"public policy" review before implementing any of its decisions. It
should allow for a detailed costlbenefit analysis of the effects of such
tariffs on "developing countries" and other nations that have endured
circumstances akin to the tsunami disaster. The U,S. seems to be
willing to go in such a direction as the ITC has reopened the case
against India and Thailand due to the effects of the tsunami. 109 This
same sentiment should be present in all dumping considerations, not
only following a disaster of epic proportions.
RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE U,S. ANTIDUMPING REGULATORY
REGIME
In light of the issues discussed in the shrimp dumping case, as
well as the dumping determination process in general, there are a
number of actions the U.S. could take to improve the process for the
good of all parties without jeopardizing the protection of domestic
industries from true predatory dumping. As previously indicated, the
lOti Sebastian Mallaby, A Fishy Approach to Fair Trade, WASI·!.
POST, March 29, 2004, at A23, available at http://www.citac.info/shrimp/news/
washrJiosl_04 I404.htm,
The Shrimp Game, WASH. POST, April 25, 2005, at Al8, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2005/04124.
lOR See Mallaby, supra note 106.
109 See The Shrimp Game, supra note 107.
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first of such changes would be the repeal of the Byrd Amendment.
This anachronistic instrument serves only to hann U.S. interests more
than help them. While certain lobbying groups in the country will
argue otherwise, this measure has run its course. It is a measure fitting
of the mid-twentieth century when domestic interests feared the
expansion of global trade. The development of technology and advent
of globalism have opened up the world to unprecedented dependent
relationships. This measure only serves to distract from this
momentum while at the same time harming those it is supposed to
protect.
Within the dumping determination process in particular, there
needs to be a practice of allowing respondents in antidumping
investigations to rebut any evidence against them. lID The U.S. legal
system provides such rights. Without such a mechanism, domestic
industries will continue to have a low burden in establishing dumping
claims. One could also address this low burden by requiring the
domestic producers to present solid evidence of dumping when filing a
petition. III Under the present scheme, domestic industries need not
require much proof at all when filing a petition, which in turn leaves
respondents at their mercy. Often, these domestic companies may
simply be moving forward with a claim as a way of scaring a
respondent out of the market. Surely, the antidumping system should
provide a protection against such misguided uses.
Another possible remedy to the American regime would be to
eliminate the use of "zeroing" in the calculation of the "dumping
margin." 112 Given that the WTO prohibits its use and the fact that the
U.S. has resisted using it in a particular case with Canada, the time has
long since passed to eradicate the method from the regulatory process.
Along these same lines, the U.S. should reign in the use of
"cumulation" in its dumping determination. Without completely
eliminating it, the U.S. should set a higher de minimis threshold when
accumulating imports. I ]J Under this theory, any dumping margin
below a certain percent is treated as zero. l14 While the WTO
agreement provides for a threshold of 2%, the U.S. operates under a
system that sets the limit at 0.5%. At the very least, the United States
liO Brink Lindsey & Dan Ikenson, R€{forming the Antidumping Agreement:
A Road Map for WTO Negotiations, CATO INSTITUTE CENTER FOR TRADE
POLICY STUDIES, Dec. 11,2002, at 12.
III ld. at 13.
112 ld. at 19.
113 ld. at 33.
114 ld.
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should acclimate the WTO level. This type of action will help reduce
the number of unnecessary dumping cases. lIS
As mentioned previously, another recommended change involves
the implementation of a public-policy test. 116 Such a provision would
serve to comply with the "developing countries" provision of the WTO
agreement and would provide needed flexibility in a volatile political
and business world. A public policy provision would force the ITA
and ITC to examine all sides of an issue and provide for a more
equitable remedy.
Finally, the U.S. should em~loy a termination policy that differs
from its current review process. 11 As noted earlier, the U.S. system
allows for review of an antidumping claim after five years. However,
the current process does not always result in a review after this time
period. A respondent must initiate such a review and the petitioners
always have a right to contest. Once initiated, the entire review process
often takes longer than a year. Taken together, this whole process can
often result in a six or seven year lenn, even if the tariff is not
continued. Thus, initial dumping violators are additionally punished
even if they have corrected their activities with the five-year period. A
more equitable system would be to have the duty completely sunset
after five years. 1" A petitioner will still have to right to bring an
additional claim against any continued violators and the DOC could
construct a system of expedited review for alleged repeat offenders.
CONCLUSION
Over the past century, U.S. antidumping law has developed from
a judicially enforced system grounded in antitrust law to an
administrative-based regulatory operation. Whether the result of
expanding global trade slemming from technological innovation or the
evolution of domestic legal policy with regard to international business,
this transition has been anything but smooth. As U.S. antidumping
regulation grew more complicated over time, international frustration
with its policies increased. What the United States is left with today is
a regulatory regime that remains inconsistent with many of the
requirements it had agreed to when signing onto the WTO Agreement
in 1994 following the Uruguay Round of discussions.
1t5 Id.
116 Id at 34.
117 ld. at 35.
tI8/d.
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As the U.S. shrimp antidumping case has demonstrated, there are
numerous areas of controversy involving the resolution of dumping
disputes in the United States. The "Byrd Amendment" has generated a
large amount of opposition from many U.S. trading partners since its
passage in 2001. Most of the U.S. business community as well as
consumers would benefit greatly from the repeal of this subsidy-like
measure. Surely, Congress can come up with more proactive methods
to support and stabilize certain struggling U.S. industries.
The use of Itcumulation" and IIzeroingtt also has incurred the
resistance of many free trade proponents. Both techniques fall short in
promoting fairness in the open market. "Cumulation" runs contrary to
the idea of sovereignty. Unless one can establish that importers from
multiple countries are working in concert to bring domestic prices
dOWll l combining the imports from various countries ignores the
territorial integrity of the involved nations. The use of "zeroing" fails
to provide equity in dumping determinations and often leads to
imperfect results. Such inexactitude removes the fairness that many
U.S. elected leaders so often reference when discussing the realities of
free trade. The United States must take the necessary steps to remove
such protectionist mechanisms from its antidumping procedures.
The inclusion of special allowances for tldeveloping countries" in
the WTO Agreement represents the boundless possibilities of free trade
to not only support the economies of the developed world but also to
improve economic situations in these respective countries. However,
the lack of guidance in Article 15 of the Agreement has led to the
ineffectiveness of this aspirational goal. While the United States,
European Union, and other "developed nations" should seek to operate
within this ideal, the WTO would be wise to craft a more explicit
provision. Hopefully, some progress will be made with regard to such
provisions in the current Doha Round of Negotiations.
Finally, there are a number of additional steps that the United
States can take to improve its detennination process. These include:
allowing respondents in antidumping investigations to rebut any
evidence against them; requiring the domestic producers to present
solid evidence of dumping when filing a petition; implementing a
public-interest test; setting a higher de minimis threshold when
accumulating imports; and employing a termination policy that differs
from its current review process.
While these recommended actions would probably not resolve all
of the issues pertaining to the United States' current antidumping
policy, they would allow it to operate more fluidly in an ever-changing
global environment. Given that this global market will undoubtedly
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continue to expand with future advances in technology, U.S. consumers
and producers will best succeed by operating within a system that
affords them the flexibility necessary to compete. Although these
recommendations may not fully achieve this result, they represent a
break from a status quo that has only served to inhibit the best interests
of many within both the American business and consumer
communities.

